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VIEW FROM THE

Adm. Bobby Inman:

"Intelligence Should be the
Front Line of Defense"

Two intelligence chiefs discuss the state of affairs of U.S. intelligence and its international implications in a rare and candid interview. Adm. Bobby Inman, former deputy director, CIA, and Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, former director, DIA, address this nation's intelligence preparedness and the opposition at home and abroad.

by Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, USAF (Ret.),
ME/C Military Affairs Editor

ME/C: Your concerns for the flow of high technology from the West to the Soviet Union have been reported widely by the press. You have been criticized for proposing some industrial and academic discipline here in the United States. Would you state your concern and give us some suggestions to halt this hemorrhaging of one of our principal strengths vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.?

Inman: For a decade we took as a given that trade with the Soviet Union and the East European allies was going to be good — good for us. We hoped that encouraging the East European countries to pull away from the Soviets might make the Soviets easier to deal with on political matters. Ten years later, one has to stop and wonder if that's been fully realized, but that's a totally different topic. In that climate of the emphasis on trade, however, little examination was focused on technological loss — how the Soviets used the open access that was provided by the desire for trade to search for material that would help accelerate their own defense build-up.

A few thoughtful members of Congress began to worry about this problem two years ago. Senator Nunn began structuring hearings before the 1980 election. They did not come off until later; but he asked shortly after the current Congress was formed, that Senator Goldwater formally request intelligence to provide a community-wide assessment of the technology-loss problem to the Soviets. A great deal of effort was dedicated to the problem. The right people from a number of agencies worked hard at it for six months. They scrounged through all the files for any shred of information which might relate, and put it together. The results were startling. The conclusions were highly classified, in the aggregate, but a great many detailed examples documented, to the reasonable satisfaction of anyone examining them, that the Soviets were running a very sophisticated operation, vacuum-cleaning the United States. The Soviets were looking for what was going on in the way of new research, new development, new weapons systems, and even such things as productivity improvements and how to make composite materials. When they found what was going on, the Soviets, using a very careful, well-considered method, went out to acquire that which they wanted. The first approach was to buy legally, and when they couldn't buy it legally, they would try to get a

work, they would fail, they would fail, they would fail (because of the opposition to them that which

That study was During the week government began

loss and what actions they might take to regulate or legislate the control of loss. Over these many years of government service, I came to view with substantial skepticism those government efforts to regulate without some consultation with those who are to be regulated. So in this instance, I decided to try to stir my colleagues in the outside world into addressing the problem themselves. That moved at a little faster pace than I had planned. I went to a symposium for the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and I listened to some academics from the floor assert that no useful research had ever come from classified research, and that never, under any circumstances, could any kind of restraint on the publication of results from research ever be acceptable. Given my knowledge of the loss and the steps being contemplated, I used some rather colorful language to convey my view that they weren't living in the real world — that if they were to avoid the potential for regulation that was not carefully thought out, the academicians had better give some thought to the problem themselves. It has been my experience, from the parallel of the narrow example in the field of cryptology, that when a broad cross-section of people finally gets involved in addressing the problem and accepts as a given that there is a national security concern, they come up with some very good ideas, such as those which the government is now trying. The plans are not to the total satisfaction of all those in the government, but from my sense, it's a substantial help in dealing with the problem in that area.

I also gave those views to some senior officials in organizations like the National Academy of Science and the National Academy of Engineering. I was very pleased when they elected to jointly sponsor a study effort by a panel headed by Dr. Dale Carson and funded by the National Science Foundation. They had a narrow charter to look only at the university-sponsored research. And as I indicated in public testimony a year ago, that's only a small part of the problem. But it is a part, I think, that is going to grow. To successfully cut off the loss across the defense